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Abstract 
This paper is in five main parts. The first introduces membership categorisation 
analysis (MCA) as originally outlined by Harvey Sacks and, here, as a possible 
extension of semiotic analysis. MCA is broadly a contribution to discourse 
analysis in general and to conversation analysis in particular. The approach 
concerns membership categorisation devices such as family, the categories they 
can contain such as ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘child’, etc. and the category-bound 
activities or predicates commonsensically attachable to such categories. The 
second section looks at the legal background to family law in Australia and 
shows that its basic assumption is, by and large and with some exceptions, to 
work from categories (what people are) rather than from predicates (what they 
in fact do). In the third section, we examine a particular Family Court case (Re 
Patrick) which highlights the contestation between these approaches. Following 
this, we examine some recent shifts in the Australian states and territories 
towards more predicationally-based legislation and argue for their coherence in 
contemporary society and its increasingly flexible conceptions of what may 
constitute a family. Finally, we return to the question of semiotics generally and 
make a case for our MCA-based distinctions as contributions to a possible 
semiotics of law. 
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Family as a commonsensical device and its place in law 
 
In the beginning was the deed — Goethe 
 
 
 
 
1. Membership categorisation: devices, categories and predicates 
 
Membership categorisation analysis (MCA) is a well-accepted approach in the 
areas of conversation analysis and ethomethodology — yet it is hardly known in 
mainstream semiotics, let alone in social semiotics; and even less so in the 
comparatively recent uptake of social semiotics by legal scholars. Despite this, 
we think the basics of MCA could have important consequences for the emergent 
field of legal semiotics and we try to show this here by reference to aspects of 
family law in Australia. 
 
It is also no coincidence that the founder of conversation analysis (and its MCA 
sub-branch), Harvey Sacks, was legally trained. He took his law degree from 
Yale (in 1959) before studying for his PhD in sociology at Berkeley (in 1966) and 
then moved into the field probably best known as linguistic sociology. To this 
extent, his work has untapped potential for understanding how legal 
frameworks (in the broadest possible sense) might operate. We consider his 
foundational work in MCA and its possible consequences for reforming official-
legal versions of the concept of ‘family’.1 
 
In his paper ‘On the Analyzability of Stories by Children’, Sacks worked through 
a very simple pair of sentences uttered by a child aged two years and nine 
months, in response to a series of pictures.2 The child looked at the first two 
pictures (a standard pre-school test) and spoke as follows: ‘The baby cried. The 
mommy picked it up’. 
 
In many ways, this is unremarkable: a very young child is telling what she 
already knows about families. Yet, in another sense, it tells us a great deal about 
                                                 
1 For a fuller explication of Sacks and MCA, see David Silverman, Harvey Sacks: Social 
Science and Conversation Analysis (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), at 74-97. 
2 Harvey Sacks, “On the Analyzability of Stories by Children”, in Directions in 
Sociolinguistics, eds. John Gumperz and Dell Hymes (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1972), 325-345. 
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how commonsensical conceptions of the thing called ‘family’ happen to work on 
an everyday basis. 
 
If we go back again to the original sentences, we can see that they contain no 
possessive or genitive elements. That is, there is nothing, as it were, in the sheer 
language used, to tell us that the mother is the mother of the baby. ‘The baby 
cried. The mommy picked it up’ — simpliciter. And yet, for any English speaker, 
we have to hear it that the ‘mommy’ was the ‘mommy’ of the baby. We hear the 
‘of’, yet it is not present in the text as such. Semiotically, we have a remarkable 
phenomenon: a signified (possessive) without a signifier (‘of’). Naturally, then, a 
strictly formal-textual semiotics, one which would ideally read off signifieds 
from actually present material signifiers, cannot analyse the case in hand. So, on 
an MCA account, how is the possessive heard without being spoken? 
 
This has to do with ingrained, commonsensical, mostly Western, but increasingly 
global conceptions of what a family is. ‘Family’ is a membership categorisation 
device (MCD). We know, by virtue of our training, which members can be part 
of the device: mother, father, son, daughter ... etc. So when we hear ‘baby’ and 
‘mother’ in adjacent sentences, we collect the two into the MCD ‘family’. And so 
that’s how we hear the genitive or possessive (normally signified in English by 
‘of’ or apostrophe-‘s’) even though it is strictly absent from the two sentences in 
question. The ‘mommy’ is the ‘mommy’ of the ‘baby’ because there is an MCD 
called ‘family’ and that device contains certain members and not others. 
 
This has two rather handy consequences for everyday linguistic usage. The first 
is this: for any given person, there are an indefinite number of ways of referring 
to them. Someone can be, for example, a chiropractor, George’s mother, the chair 
of the Netball Club committee, a gifted amateur artist, John’s sister, the woman 
next-door, a redhead, the Rabbi’s niece.... Need we continue? All of these 
descriptions and many more are, in a strictly formal sense, true. Each applies to 
the person in question. But what, in any given discursive situation, should that 
person be called? Sacks then points to sequential relevance (as opposed to mere 
correctness) as the way of referring to persons. Correctness, as a criterion for 
reference, will generate indefinite possibilities. Selection from a sequentially 
relevant MCD will, by contrast, provide appositeness. Hence, if the first sentence 
offers ‘the baby’, the second will (where possible) offer a co-member of the same 
MCD: mother, father, sister, etc. In that way, we can hear, without being told, 
that, if ‘mother’ is selected, the person referred to in the second sentence is the 
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mother of the baby referred to in the first. 
 
The second upshot is this: when we refer to persons in terms of their incumbency 
in an MCD, we can hear, without being explicitly told, the kinds of things that 
they may be expected to do. These expectable actions can be called ‘category 
bound activities’ or ‘predicates’. Some predicates are, as Sacks calls them, 
‘device-wide’: that is, they pertain to all members included in a device. If ‘family’ 
is an MCD, then, one device-wide predicate would be something like 
‘unconditional support’. No matter what happens to one member, it may be 
expected that all the others would support them. 
 
A telling illustration of this arises in an albeit fictional case where the expected 
predicate is reversed: the soap-opera Dallas. Here the point of the show was to 
represent a family, the Ewings, who, on any given occasion, would do their best 
to sabotage each other and thereby triumph as individuals in, for example, 
business, personal relationships or prestige. The reversal shows up the normally 
expectable device-wide predicate.3 
 
On the other hand, particular category incumbents in an MCD may, by virtue of 
their specific positioning in the device, have their respectively specific predicates. 
Hence: babies cry, mothers pick them up and not vice versa! Or, to use the MCD 
‘professions’: if we hear that someone rides a red moped and puts envelopes into 
letterboxes, we also hear from that action description (predicate or category-
bound activity) just what position they hold within that MCD. We can hear the 
type of profession from the activity description — and vice versa. 
 
Semiotically, the main interest of MCA is that it gives us an analytic means of 
describing what was once a rather fuzzy and possibly mentalistic process: that of 
implication and inference — and, as we will see in the final section of this paper, 
this has some possible connections with Peirce’s third form of reasoning, 
abduction.4 To imply something about a person then means that one gives a 
description of what they do, such that another can infer (or, for Peirce, 
‘hypothesise’) their category incumbency — or else vice versa. If these dual 
                                                 
3  On all such matters, see Rod Watson, “Categorizations, Authorization and Blame-
Negotiation in Conversation”, Sociology 12/1 (1978), 105-113. Also: Maria T. Wowk, 
“Blame-Allocation: Sex and Gender in a Murder Interrogation”, Women’s Studies 
International Forum 7/1 (1984), 75-82. 
4  Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-
1958), at 2.623. 
MCA/Family Law, page 5 
matters connecting relevant category and relevant predicate (hence inference and 
implication) are deeply embedded matters of common sense — such that, for 
example, it is all but impossible to hear something like ‘The baby cried. One of its 
mothers picked it up’ — then how can a strictly legal entity such a ‘family’ be 
demarcated without recourse to commonsensical use of the naturally-available 
MCD also called ‘family’ and the device-wide (or, indeed, category-specific) 
predicates routinely attached to it? 
 
The space of family legislation might then be represented (somewhat 
metaphorically) as the space between the following two possibilities: (1) whoever 
picks the baby up (acts the relevant predicate) is, by definition, ‘the mother’ (the 
category) and (2) only the one pre-designated as ‘the mother’ (the category) can 
pick the baby up (act the relevant predicate). That is: does the predicate legally 
define the category position, or vice versa? This is where legal discourse comes 
into confluence (or not) with everyday category use. 
 
Family law (at least in Australia and other nations once formed as British 
colonies) has traditionally granted rights and duties on the basis of category 
incumbency rather than actual predicational enactment. For example, those 
designated as ‘fathers’ by virtue of inseminational status, may acquire legal 
status, even if they take no part in standard ‘fatherly’ activities such as caring for 
the child in question as a co-parent. And, as we illustrate below, it is also difficult 
for the Family Court to recognise a person who is the partner of the mother, who 
cares for the child as a father (or as the ‘partner of the mother’) might be 
expected to, but who also happens to be a woman. Any such second woman’s 
categorical status — which must always be outwith the ‘family’ device and fall 
into the alternative device of something like ‘mere relationships’ — takes 
precedence over her actual worldly actions (predicates): feeding, nursing, 
teaching, indeed picking up, the crying child; just as a father might on the 
standard view. The question for family law today, then, is: should it maintain 
strict categorisational means of identifying and recognising persons or should it 
consider predicational status and decide accordingly? 
 
 
2. Legal background 
 
The traditional approach to legislating on family, at least since 1975 with the 
passing of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (FLA), has been to determine family by 
MCA/Family Law, page 6 
reference to strict categories. This comes as much from constitutional limits on 
the power of the Commonwealth as from any putative ‘mindset’ of 
Commonwealth and state governments. 
 
The Commonwealth is limited by the s51 constitutional heads of power of 
‘marriage’ (placitum xxi) and ‘divorce and matrimonial causes’ (placitum xxii). 
Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee5 provides the authoritative definition of the legal 
institution of marriage as ‘the voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman, to the exclusion of all others’. This definition has been accepted as the 
terms of the marriage powers in Australia.6 
 
The language of Hyde is reflected in both the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) and the 
FLA. Section 43(a) of the latter provides that any exercise of the Act’s jurisdiction 
shall have regard to the ‘need to preserve and protect the institution of marriage 
as the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others voluntarily 
entered into for life’. This, it would seem, is Australian family, firmly entrenched 
for almost thirty years, since the passing of the FLA. In short, the FLA places the 
MCD ‘family’ squarely before the court, which legally defines the categories it 
should contain. That is, family for the purposes of the FLA is formed through the 
exclusive union of one man and one woman, and the natural or adoptive issue of 
that union. 
 
The effect of these jurisdictional limits is that only the parties to a marriage can 
bring an action in the Family Court. However, the provisions relating to children 
are an exception to the normal jurisdictional limits of the Act. The FLA 
comprehensively deals with children’s matters, including the determination of 
parenting orders (residence, contact and specific issues orders). The paramount 
consideration for the court, when making parenting orders, is the ‘best interests 
of the child’7 rather than any perceived ‘right’ of the applicant. Following the 
transfer of powers by the states (except WA which has maintained its own 
parallel system), the FLA deals nationally and uniformly with all matters 
pertaining to the welfare of children, not withstanding the constitutional 
requirement that the Commonwealth’s powers be limited to matters pertaining 
to marriage. Because of the states’ transfer, the FLA addresses matters concerning 
                                                 
5 (1866) LR 1 P&D 130, per Sir James Wilde. 
6 Per Mason and Brennan JJ in Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242 at 259-60 and 
Brennan J in The Queen v L (1991) 174 CLR 379 at 392. 
7 s65E. 
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ex-nuptial children as well as the children of marriage, and can receive 
applications from the parents, the child or ‘any other person concerned with the 
care, welfare or development of the child’.8 The ‘best interests of the child’ test 
does not displace the traditional (marriage-based) conception of ‘family’. It 
merely indicates a starting point for determining parenting orders. Nevertheless, 
in the case of property disputes, the case remains that only parties to a marriage, 
as such, can bring an action in the Family Court.9 The litigants are officially 
deemed to be ‘the husband’ and ‘the wife’ (in property matters) but, via the 
MCD ‘family’, these can easily be readily transferred into ‘the father’ and ‘the 
mother’ where parenting (as opposed to property) is concerned. 
 
The Family Court has, historically, shown a propensity to ‘category-centredness’; 
that is, to be swayed by conventions commonly used to allocate incumbency in 
the MCD ‘family’.10 This is partly explained by the Act’s own leanings. We have 
noted the jurisdictional limits and s43(a) above. In addition, Section 64C provides 
that: 
 
A Parenting Order in relation to a child may be made in favour of a parent 
of the child or some other person (emphasis added). 
 
Finally, s65C provides that: 
                                                 
8 s65C. 
9 The exception is WA which has established a parallel legislative regime, which 
replicates the FLA but with application to families headed by de facto couples 
(heterosexual and same-sex): Family Court Act 1975 (WA). 
10 For example, it was presumed by the Family Court until the mid-1970s that it was in 
children’s best interests to be with their mother (the ‘mother principle’). The principle 
was rejected by the High Court in Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513. The Family 
Court had also relied on the correlating presumption that the father’s role was to be out 
working. McMillan v Jackson [1995] FLC ¶92-610 was an appeal from a decision that the 
father should not be granted custody because it would mean than he would become 
dependent upon social security. The Full Court noted that ‘his Honour’s pre-conception 
that the father should be out working to support his son, rather than staying at home to 
look after his day to day needs, played a significant part in his determination of this case’ 
(at 82,084, per Baker, Lindenmayer and Burton JJ). Other cases have invoked s43 to 
support the view that a child’s best interests are better served in the care of the parents 
than in the care of an extended family member or some other non-related person: 
Obrenovic v McCauley [1985] FLC ¶91-655 per Gee J and Drew and Drew (1993) FLC ¶92-
360 per Treyvaud J. However, more recent cases have stated that there is to be no 
presumption that the natural parents should be favoured, over other persons, and that 
each case is to be determined by reference to the facts and the individuals before the 
Court. For example, Re Hodak [1993] FLC ¶92-421 per Lindenmayer J, and the Full Court 
in Rice v Miller  [1993] FLC ¶92-415 and Re C and D [1998] FLC ¶92-815. 
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A Parenting Order ... may be applied for by; 
(a) either or both of the child’s parents; or 
(b) the child; or 
(c) any other person concerned with the care, welfare or development of the 
child (emphasis added). 
 
So there is, as we shall see, some leeway. But it is nevertheless the case that the 
statute indicates that ‘some other person’ is a secondary consideration by 
comparison with the norm of ‘a parent’ and where ‘a parent’ will, ideally, be a 
husband-father or a wife-mother. In the ideal scenario, membership work is 
being done (in and through the text of the law) such that the mother is the 
mother of the child, the father is the father of the child, the mother is the wife of 
the husband, and the husband is the husband of the wife. Then, as it were, after 
the fact, there may (or may not) be ‘some other person’. 
 
So whilst the child’s best interests are paramount, irrespective of the relationship 
to that child of the person applying for an order,11 this principle resides within 
the context of indications that marriage, and biological or legally adoptive 
parents have priority over other persons in a hierarchy of relationships.12 These 
provisions are not, however, prescriptive. They do not, in themselves, determine 
parenting orders. It is, then, possible for family law determinations to be made 
outside the commonsensical strictures of the device ‘family’ (mother, father, 
child, etc.), and such determinations have in fact been made. After all the notion 
of ‘the child’s best interests’ does, we must concede, veer more towards 
predication than sheer categorisation. But how did this possibility pan out in an 
actual case where there was dispute between doing parenting (as predicate) and 
‘biological’ fatherhood (as sheer category membership)? 
 
 
3. A case in point 
 
Re Patrick13 is one of many cases which give an insight into the difficulty for the 
                                                 
11 As affirmed in the above cases. 
12 Rebuttable presumptions of parentage reflecting biological connection are provided 
under Part VII, Div. 12. Section 60D provides that parenting includes adoptive parents 
and that adoption refers to adoption under the law of the place of adoption. 
13 Re Patrick and An Application Concerning Contact (2002) FLC ¶93-096. 
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Court in making determinations pursuant to Part VII matters (pertaining to 
children) when handling disputes concerning non-traditional familial 
arrangements. We present this case specifically because it directs itself to the 
question of the meaning of both ‘family’ and ‘parent’ and explores the 
complexity of such matters. The questions before the Court were whether a 
sperm donor, known or anonymous, is a ‘parent’ within the scope of the FLA, 
pursuant to s60H,14 and whether contact on part of the father-donor, was in the 
best interests of the child. Further it was a case in which the judge went to some 
length to think broadly about family, and yet, we believe, was restrained by the 
commonsensical (and equally strictly legal) device of family. 
 
In deciding these matters Guest J reflects on the constitution of family for the 
child, ‘Patrick’. Referring to Millbank, a scholar in the area of same-sex 
relationships, his Honour says that ‘the traditional hetero-nuclear family does 
not now reflect the reality of the various family forms within modern society’, 
noting that ‘family’ now also includes ‘homo-nuclear families’.15 He discusses 
the concept broadly and, for us, with admirable possibilities for semiotic 
tolerance/play: 
 
The term ‘family’ has a flexible and wide meaning. It is not one fixed in 
time and is not a term of art. It necessarily and broadly encompasses a 
description of a unit which has ‘familiar characteristics’. Not all families 
function in the same way. Never the less, they enjoy common 
characteristics such as those demonstrated by the applicants [‘the mother’ 
and her same-sex partner]. Theirs is not of a casual or transitory nature 
but one that has embraced exclusivity and permanency. They are 
emotionally and financially inter-dependent and I have no doubt, share 
common interests, activities and companionship. Their biological and 
psychological relationship to and mutual care of Patrick makes it so much 
more obvious. In my view it would stultify the necessary progress of 
family law in this country if society were not to recognise the applicants as 
a ‘family’ when they offer that which is consistent and parallel with 
heterosexual families, save for the obviousness of being a same-sex 
couple.16 
 
Guest J stresses that gay and lesbian families can take many forms and should 
                                                 
14 Supra n.13 at 88 870. 
15 Supra n.13 at 88 927.  
16 Supra n.13 at 88 927. 
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not be understood as an homogeneous group. The family may be comprised of 
two mothers or two fathers, two mothers and one father (as in the case of Patrick, 
as characterised by the Court) or two fathers and two mothers. The diversity of 
form is reflected also in the role of the father in relation to children conceived via 
artificial insemination. The father role need not be a ‘traditional “fatherly” 
role’.17 
 
Patrick’s family, his Honour concludes, is a homo-nuclear family, comprised of 
the mother and the co-parent (the mother’s partner).18 He notes that the matter 
before the Court is ultimately not dissimilar to matters that arise from 
heterosexual nuclear families and are decided by the Court on a daily basis.19 
The question here is: what is the role of the biological father and, consequently, 
what is the appropriate degree of contact? 
 
A critical issue for the Court in determining this matter is whether the agreement 
between the parents (particularly ‘the mother’, as the ‘biological’ mother is 
known in the judgment) and the donor was that the donor would be an 
anonymous donor or a known donor. Further, if the donor were to be a known 
donor, what would be the capacity of this acknowledgement — as ‘father’ or in 
some other relationship? Guest J, preferring the evidence of the ‘father’ (as the 
donor was known in the judgment) to that of the ‘mother’ and ‘co-parent’ (as the 
judgment refers to the mother’s partner), decides that the agreement between the 
parties was that the father would have a role in the child’s life.20 In other words, 
he was to be a ‘known’ donor. 
 
What was this role to be? This seems to be the real crux of the case, 
notwithstanding the primary issue of the terms of the arrangement. With great 
respect to Guest J, who must be credited with becoming informed about 
alternative family modelling, particularly in gay and lesbian contexts, it is 
arguable that the ultimate decision rested, in part, on hetero-normative 
conceptions of family. For having determined that there was an intention for the 
donor to be a known donor, Guest J searches for the opportunity to deem him to 
be a ‘parent’ — with all the customary predicates of that role — rather than an 
‘other person’ under the provisions of the FLA. This suggests that Guest J was 
operating from the position of well-known binaries (see the table below) under 
which only those marked as being parents are understood to be ‘doing family’, 
                                                 
17 Supra n.13 at 88 927-8. 
18 Supra n.13 at 88 926. 
19 Supra n.13 at 88 927. 
20 Supra n.13 at 88 895, 88 918. 
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such that the ‘other person’ category is diminished in this respect. 21 This 
ultimately led to contact arrangements which equated with those the Court 
would normally order in relation to the non-residential partner of a hetero-
nuclear family. 
 
Known biological or legal Non-biological, non-legal or not known 
biological 
Parent Non-Parent 
Parental relationship ‘Other person’ relationship 
Significant amounts of contact Limited amounts of contact 
 
It seems that, for Guest J, having established that it was intended that Patrick’s 
father be a known donor, the latter also becomes a parent, notwithstanding the 
failure of the FLA to acknowledge this. Consequently, Patrick has a right to 
maintain a parent-child relationship with his ‘father’. This justified contact 
arrangements normally ordered in applications on the part of a parent, pursuant 
to s60B, which establishes the principles that: 
 
(2)(a) children have the right to know and be cared for by both their 
parents regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have 
never married or have never lived together; and 
(b) children have a right of contact, on a regular basis, with both their 
parents and with other people significant to their care.22 
 
The contact arrangements were settled, despite the Court having noted that the 
mother and co-parent, along with Patrick, formed a homo-nuclear family. In 
effect, however, the Court construes Patrick’s family as comprised of mother, co-
parent, father (as opposed to ‘other person’) and child, with the father-role 
surpassing the co-parent role in significance. In other words, the hetero-nuclear 
family was re-affirmed as the model for the judgment, with the co-parent 
becoming no more than an ‘other person’. This is further indicated by a telling 
language slip where his Honour mistakenly refers to the biological father as the 
‘husband’, drawing, of course, on the single categories usually before the 
Court23 — and, perhaps, displaying the FLA’s historical grounding in questions 
                                                 
21 ‘Other person’, to this extent, is effectively a secondary category even though the FLA 
is not limited to such a reading. Implicit in our argument is the idea that ‘other person’ is 
semiotically open and could include persons seen to be actively ‘doing family’. 
22 The order in this hierarchy is significant, that is that the relationship with a parent is 
more important than the relationship with significant others, as indicated by the lexical 
ordering of the clauses of the provision, and confirmed by Guest J. Supra n.13 at 88 924. 
23 Supra n.13 at 88 903. 
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of marriage. 
 
Hetero-normative trends in contact were consequently applied in the Patrick 
case: a progressive expansion of contact time over a period of four years, 
culminating by 2004 with Friday-to-Monday contact on alternate weekends and 
an assurance that Patrick have contact with the ‘father’ on Father’s Day. The 
Court ordered the norms of contact adopted for hetero-normative family 
relationships. 
 
If, however, we were to view the known donor as an ‘other person’, 
notwithstanding the ‘biological’ relationship, then we open the door to more 
creative contact arrangements as, say, we might if the applicant were a member 
of the extended family or a close family friend; that is some ‘other person’ with a 
significant relationship to the child. The judgment indicates that this scenario is 
exactly what the homo-nuclear family was concerned about — that the 
relationship between the donor and Patrick would be equated with a father-son 
relationship at the expense of the homo-nuclear family constituted by Patrick, his 
biological mother and the social mother (or co-parent). As the judgment reports: 
 
In the course of her evidence, the mother said that there was no need for a 
‘... parental’ father in Patrick’s life. When asked why Patrick should be 
different from any other child and not have a right to know his father, the 
mother jauntily responded ‘...because he’s got leso’s [sic] for parents’. [...] 
She said that if a parental relationship developed between the father and 
Patrick, it would conflict with the parenting offered by the co-parent and 
herself. [...] The mother agreed, when cross examined [...] that her 
objection to contact was based upon a fundamental belief that children can 
be raised in a lesbian household without a father (in the traditional sense). 
[...] From what I have both heard and read, it is doubtless true that 
children can be happily raised within a homo-nuclear family, but the 
difference here is that the father desires and has always desired to play an 
active and fatherly role in the life of his son.24 
 
When it was put to the mother that Patrick had two families she responded: ‘No, 
he has one family and he has a donor’.25 
 
While Guest J accepts the legitimacy of the homo-nuclear family form, he 
suggests that the mother had a ‘hardened’ position and characterised her view 
                                                 
24 Supra n.13 at 88 884. Our ellipses in square brackets; others original. 
25 Supra n.13 at 88 885. 
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and that of the co-parent as predicated on ‘philosophical and ideological 
bases’.26 The mother’s desire to maintain a homo-nuclear family model was, in 
effect, dismissed as a ‘philosophical and ideological’ position, obstructing a 
resolution, which could include the father-donor as incumbent in the device 
‘family’. 
 
What Guest J may have failed to appreciate is that the desire to involve the father 
was in itself a ‘position’, in fact a commonsensically anchored social position, 
which Patrick’s family was trying to counter by moving to a more predication-
based account. The involvement of the donor, as father, was, perhaps, as alien to 
the conception of family held by the mother and co-parent, as the conception of a 
two-parent, fatherless family was to the Court and, perhaps, to the broader, 
hetero-normative community. The viewpoints indicated differing ideas of the 
categories that could come to comprise the device ‘family’. The mother’s view of 
what constitutes ‘family’, significantly enough, was enabled by establishing it 
according to the predicational, rather than categorical, aspects of the 
relationships. On the mother’s characterisation, her partner did in fact ‘do being 
a parent’ — she had all the predicational characteristics of the category ‘parent’ 
(‘mother’ and/or ‘father’) in the device ‘family’ but was not granted incumbency 
in the device; by contrast with one (the donor) who would commonsensically 
have such incumbency without ever having to display the predicate of 
‘parenting’. 
 
It is unlikely that there could have been a mutually agreeable outcome for this 
case because of the complexity of the issues and the base position of the FLA. 
Guest J notes the difficulties of the case given the heterosexist basis of the FLA. 
He says that: 
 
It is clear that gay and lesbian families were not considered by the 
legislature when s60H of the Act was being drafted. These families differ 
in significant ways from heterosexual families who access artificial 
insemination services.… [I]t is time that the legislature considered some of 
the matters raised, including the nature of parenthood, the meaning of 
‘family’ and the role of the law in regulating arrangements within the gay 
and lesbian community. The child at the centre of this dispute is part of a 
new and rapidly increasing generation of children being conceived and 
raised by gay and lesbian parents. However, under the current legislative 
regime, Patrick’s biological and social reality remains unrecognised.27 
                                                 
26 Supra n.13 at 88 886. 
27 Supra n.13 at 88 929. 
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Nevertheless, whilst the judgment indicated research into alternative parenting 
arrangements and the issues of same-sex families — a real and stated desire on 
the part of Guest J to adopt an alternative framework — he was limited by a 
standard commonsensical version of familial possibilities. 
 
What does this case stand for? What is its ratio? An interpretation of family was 
not a key issue for the Court, except as an addendum to the issue of whether or 
not being a sperm donor was sufficient to entitle parenthood. On this latter point 
Guest J answers the question ‘is a known sperm donor, a “parent”?’ in the 
negative, finding that a sperm donor merely has jurisdiction in the Family Court 
as ‘any other person’. Despite this finding, his Honour uses the nomenclature of 
‘father’ and attaches rights and duties to the donor accordingly, an approach 
open to him under the discretionary powers granted pursuant to s65E, but 
nevertheless indicating the social and cultural power of dominant values in the 
constitution of the family. 
 
Because the FLA is shrouded in a quite strict categorisation-centred means of 
determining the roles of persons (as opposed to a possible predication-centred 
approach), it is difficult for any Court to move beyond the conventions 
commonly seen to comprise the MCD ‘family’. Yet it is possible for the law to be 
framed in a manner which does consider the predicational status of parties and 
determine family accordingly. Indeed the Australian states and territories have 
set a trend for doing so, in relation to the property provisions of those families 
excluded from the Commonwealth jurisdiction. 
 
 
4. Legislating predicationally? 
 
It took little time for the states and territories to respond to the FLA’s limits with 
respect to the disbursement of familial property upon separation. New South 
Wales was the first state or territory to provide clear statutory rights in relation 
to the property of relationships not recognised by the FLA.28 However, like the 
FLA, the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW) defined its jurisdiction in 
categorisational terms: that is, with reference to a man and woman living in a 
                                                 
28 New South Wales Law Reform Commission Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 
1984 (NSW) Discussion Paper No. 44 (Sydney NSW, 2001) at ¶1.19. 
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marriage-like relationship.29 It sought to create a means by which families which 
looked like traditional families (but which failed the matrimonial causes test) 
could have simple rules for determining property disputes. Other states followed 
suit in introducing legislation for heterosexual de facto couples. 
 
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) was the first state or territory to break 
with this tradition. It introduced legislation which determined its application, 
that is, familial relationships, by reference to a set of predicates. Section 3(1) of 
the ACT’s Domestic Relationships Act 1994 defined ‘Domestic relationship’ as: 
 
a personal relationship (other than a legal marriage) between two adults 
in which one provides personal or financial commitment and support of a 
domestic nature for the material benefit of the other, and includes a de 
facto marriage. 
 
Under this legislation, there is no need for the parties to establish that they exist 
in a marriage-like state. This is a paradigm shift in the mode of legislating for the 
family. The ACT act, unlike other family law regimes until recently, focuses on 
actual practices performed (predicates), over category membership as such. It 
permits legal acknowledgement of any domestic relationship which has a degree 
of personal or financial interdependence, whether or not the parties have a 
sexual relationship or cohabit. In other words, it could apply to siblings, to 
friends, to lovers or any other partnership which ‘does’ being a family. 
 
Other states and territories have followed suit, with New South Wales amending 
its legislation and Tasmania introducing new predicate-based legislation — the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1999 (NSW) and the Relationships Act 2003 (Tas). 
Hence, since 1994, despite the resistance of the Commonwealth, there has been a 
movement to the alternative, where relevant predicates decide category 
membership rather than vice versa. This means that ‘family’ is determined by 
reference to whether the parties exhibit relevant conduct, generally something 
like being socially and economically interdependent (akin to the idea of, for 
example, ‘unconditional support’), rather than by reference to an established set 
of categories normatively associated with the MCD ‘family. 
 
The states have indicated their willingness to transfer further powers to the 
Commonwealth, to legislate on property matters concerning families not 
                                                 
29 s3. 
MCA/Family Law, page 16 
constituted by marriage. If so motivated, the Commonwealth could negotiate 
with the states over the framing of that legislation. However the Commonwealth 
has indicated that it is only willing to accept the transfer of state powers in 
respect to heterosexual de facto couples, retaining its conception of family as 
only very marginally divergent from that constituted by ‘traditional’ marriages. 
 
So the situation vis-à-vis family law is unique. That is, most areas of law do in fact 
operate by working from predicates to categories rather than vice-versa. They 
work from the premise of what people ‘do’ rather than what people ‘are’. A tort-
feasor is such because they have performed a wrong, and a contractor is in 
breach if they have failed to act on one of the terms of the contract or is in breach 
of some common or statutory duty of the law. One becomes ‘a murderer’ by 
virtue of undertaking certain specified social practices; ditto for becoming ‘a 
fraud’ or ‘a speeding driver’. The niceties of law, in fact, turn on how closely 
specifiable those predicates are: in tort law, an assaulter is distinguishable from a 
batterer by virtue of their practices; in criminal law, murder is finely 
distinguished from manslaughter, fraud from deceptive conduct; and speeding 
offences come in fine degrees above specified limits and norms. To continue the 
examples, there are no ‘natural’ or ‘birth-’ murderers, frauds, or speeders. 
Provably having undertaken (or committed) the relevant predicate is both 
necessary and sufficient for category incumbency to follow — often after lengthy 
investigation and litigation concerning the exact details of the specific action in 
question and with the assumption that the person in question performed the 
action freely and from choice. 
 
Why is family law such a glaring exception? Persons in the society can take on all 
the practices, actions and characteristics of the category ‘parent’ without ever 
being legally recognised as such, whereas someone who does not may be 
automatically entitled to category membership. Partners in non-hetero-
normative relationships, that is, can freely choose for themselves all of the 
predicates routinely bound to the categories of ‘mother’ and/or ‘father’ — and 
do so in ways that are evidentially provable — but under the FLA they are 
categorised in the first instance as an ‘other person’. The framing of the 
legislation permits slippages into the use of naturally-available MCDs and the 
predicates routinely attached to them. 
 
Of course, the same is true for the courts, and the jury if dealing with certain 
criminal matters. For example, a person’s race or gender may impact on the 
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determination of guilt — it may be more difficult to find a woman who has no 
criminal record guilty of a violent offence and more difficult to find someone of 
one race liable than of another. Yet, this is not essentially an issue with the law’s 
characterisation of the offence. Rather it is because, rightly or wrongly, we 
cannot help but do categorisational work in our everyday activities. However, 
what is exceptional in the area of family law specifically, is that the FLA directly 
(via the Hyde definition) or indirectly (via ss43(a), 64C and 65C) primarily defines 
its application by reference to the device and its traditional categories rather than 
to the predicates of possible family members. The widened scope in relation to 
children’s matters is an exception to the rule, but sits firmly within the context of 
an overly categorisational means of recognising parties. 
 
We are often told by ‘macro’ social theorists that late modernity (sometimes 
‘postmodernity’) is characterised by risk and uncertainty. What is rarely pointed 
out is that this ‘crisis of certainty’ impacts particularly on questions of parentage. 
To be sure, parentage has always had its potential for grey areas. However, 
contemporary society is characteristically fraught in this respect. 
 
 
5. And semiotics? 
 
In the first section of this paper, we questioned formal-textual semiotics because 
it could not be extended to incorporate a manifestly natural hearing. ‘The baby 
cried’ + ‘The mommy picked it up’: these two utterances have a hearable 
possessive that is not registered on the textual surface (the ‘black letter’) of a 
small narrative made up by the two sentences — and made up by a young child. 
We called this a signified without a signifier, and so it is. 
 
In the course of this paper, we have also seen that Australian family law (in 
general, in its specific provisions and in at least one case and its judgment) seems 
— for all the will in the world, including Guest J’s admirable criticisms of the 
legislation as it stands — unable to make the same kinds of inference from 
predicate (e.g., provably caring for a child, picking it up, etc.) to category (having 
the status of ‘parent’ or ‘mommy’). Instead, when in doubt, it tends to revert to 
well-known categories of mother-wife and father-husband vis-à-vis children. 
What are the upshots for semiotics generally and semiotics of law in particular? 
 
To start, we must agree with Umberto Eco: compositional semantics will never 
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foreground predicational status as such. It begins with categories and only ends 
with predicates where it can. In this respect, it is somewhat like the Australian 
family law itself. Eco’s classical example is from Katz and Fodor (his ‘KF’ model) 
concerning the category ‘bachelor’. The various ‘bachelors’ (Human vs. Animal) 
(Adult vs. Young), etc. etc. only end up predicationally: ‘Serving under the 
standard of another’ (a human male who is a young knight), ‘Having the 
academic degree conferred for completing the first four years of college’, being 
‘without a mate during the breeding time’ (seals!). Hence the following:30 
 
bachelor
       |
  Noun
(Human)                                             (Animal)
(M ale) [Having the academic
degree conferred for
completing the first
four years of college]
                    |
(Adult)                         (Young)
(Never-M arried)                (Knight)
              |                                       
[Serving under the
standard of another]
                 |
(M ale)
(Young)
(Seal)
[When without a
mate during the
breeding time]
                |
<ω 1>
<ω 2>
<ω 3>
<ω 4>
.
.
 
 
Again, on a Saussurean model of semiotics, we end up with an impasse not 
unlike that of family law itself. That is, for the signifier ‘parent’, we have to 
imagine what the possible signified or signifieds could be and, possibly, go 
looking for a type of person or, strictly, the ‘mental image’ of a type of person — 
given that, for Saussure, signifieds are always one or another form of 
psychological image. By contrast, an MCA approach allows the capacity to begin 
with predicates (actual worldly deeds) and only then to proceed to possible 
categories of person. The diagrams below displays this distinction: 
                                                 
30 Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), at 
97. 
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Saussurean model: 
 
Signifier —> Signified 
Parent ? 
 
MCA model: 
 
Predicate —> Category 
Cares, cleans, cooks for, 
etc. 
Parent? 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
So if we do not proceed in a strictly textual manner, either in the law, or in 
semiotics, how do we proceed? One way of going forward semiotically is to 
consider Peirce’s third mode of reasoning: abduction. He contrasts this mode 
with induction and deduction. Induction works from cases and finds rules as a 
consequence (common law perhaps). Vice-versa for deduction: it starts from 
rules and interprets given cases as such (more black letter perhaps). Semiotically, 
induction is too loose; deduction too tight. Abduction allows a different degree 
of play or tolerance. It’s hypothetical and temporary; it takes into account 
historical, social and cultural differences. Peirce’s own account of abduction is 
instructive: 
 
I once landed at a seaport in a Turkish province; and, as I was walking up 
to the house which I was to visit, I met a man upon horseback, 
surrounded by four horsemen holding a canopy over his head. As the 
governor of the province was the only personage I could think of who 
would be so greatly honored, I inferred that this was he. This was an 
hypothesis.31 
 
Peirce observed the predicational possibilities first, and only then drew inferences 
about the respective category. So, in the case of family law, an abductive 
reasoning would run: Any parent does x for a child (so: judge what should be 
done as x today, for now, in this context); this person does such things; could this 
                                                 
31 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-
1958), at 2.265. 
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person be a parent? In hindsight, an MCA account of, say, ‘governorship’, 
‘parentage’, or any number of related categorisational matters, could prove 
useful: both to semiotics as such and to the semiotics of family law today. This is 
why we suggest its inclusion in the range of analytic tools available to legal 
semioticians with an interest in progressive reform. How would family law 
proceed from Goethe’s ultimately predicational dictum, “In the beginning was 
the deed”? It would no longer be true to say that any such predicational rather 
than category-based legal conception of family is ‘socially progressive’. It is, 
rather, the most sensible and practically manageable way of governing and 
regulating family relations as such. Some of the states and territories (especially 
the ACT) have begun to acknowledge this fact, in legislating on property 
matters. The rest — and the Commonwealth— must surely follow. 
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